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SmartLoader is a Windows malware loader used in large-scale fake GitHub repository campaigns, notably FakeGit and the AI-themed AgentBaiting activity.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabSmartLoader
SmartLoader is a Windows malware loader used in large-scale fake GitHub repository campaigns, notably FakeGit and the AI-themed AgentBaiting activity. It is commonly delivered through counterfeit or cloned repositories that impersonate legitimate developer tools, AI resources, skills, and Model Context Protocol servers, where README instructions direct victims to download ZIP archives posing as installers or releases. Earlier activity also tied the broader operation to ClickFix-style social engineering.
Observed SmartLoader packages use a LuaJIT-based execution chain consisting of a launcher script, a renamed interpreter or runtime component, and an obfuscated Lua payload disguised as a benign text-like file. The loader executes the concealed Lua code in memory, a design that helps evade simple file-by-file scanning and sandbox triage. Analysis of different stages has linked the obfuscation to Prometheus-style and MoonSec-style Lua protection in separate samples.
Once active, SmartLoader performs host reconnaissance, including geolocation checks and collection of basic system details, and has been observed capturing a desktop screenshot before beaconing. It resolves command-and-control infrastructure dynamically from a Polygon smart contract using an EtherHiding-style mechanism, allowing operators to rotate infrastructure without changing the malware binary. SmartLoader then exchanges encrypted configuration and tasking with its operators, downloads additional encrypted stages from GitHub, and can establish persistence through scheduled tasks. Multiple reports describe a redundant multi-stage chain in which SmartLoader retrieves further Lua-based stages and ultimately delivers follow-on payloads.
SmartLoader is primarily a delivery mechanism for secondary malware rather than the final monetization payload. In observed campaigns it has delivered information stealers including StealC, Lumma Stealer, Vidar, Rhadamanthys, and a NodeJS-based malware-as-a-service infostealer. Some reporting also describes follow-on process injection associated with StealC deployment. The campaigns using SmartLoader have targeted AI users, developers, and organizations in sectors including financial services, banking, and technology, with victims reported across North America, Asia, and Southern Europe.
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
Samples
05ae6b542fd187c062eac38abfbfb6a9b8f35bbec3aff29950912f7d89092c5a 316d4d7a75374636720e820debad7573c70734d395129c0b6b318e4492c6f8ab 5b7aa9b73ba45f8239a1e1dae53d8b3f6b126aeec8238efd7ff8e8a15ae91e0c 6f6e834e9810adf64050a599f595dfd981c7030019ec9c4800a18444e52121c2 d89e10aa810a74e4b98c7462aac570b5a73e9e0ba3be5ee95a6610a69cd27218 4050513fd2c0e7872d037adc911283a8362a5173ff1910ff5eb8890b980e7994 Reported operators
Together, the four files make up SmartLoader, a malware loader Netskope has previously seen distributed through GitHub repositories.
There has been an extensive malware campaign, dubbed FakeGit, that utilizes thousands of counterfeit GitHub repositories to distribute SmartLoader malware... Upon activation, the attack launches a LuaJIT-based loader that launches an obfuscated Lua script to install SmartLoader.
A newly documented campaign called AgentBaiting uses fraudulent AI Skills and Model Context Protocol, or MCP, servers to distribute SmartLoader malware through trusted-looking GitHub projects and public capability catalogs.
MITRE ATT&CK
Reporting
A malvertising campaign dubbed FakeAgent abused searches for the Claude Desktop app to deliver the SectopRAT information-stealing trojan to Windows users at at least 29 organizations. Victims who clicked sponsored Bing results were sent to a spoofed public artifact hosted on Anthropic's claude.ai domain instead of the legitimate download page, then redirected to attacker-controlled infrastructure that served a fake ClaudeDesktop.exe installer. Huntress said the activity ran from July 21 to 22 and should be treated as a full remote-access and credential-theft compromise, not a nuisance adware incident. The malware chain used DLL sideloading through a tampered libcef.dll, signed-binary proxy execution, VMProtect packing, GPU-based anti-analysis, and DirectX shader-based payload decryption to evade detection. Researchers said SectopRAT established persistence with sslconf.exe, tempdir.dll, and appcfg.dat under AppData, and retrieved command data via blockchain infrastructure tied to contract 0xc1907d7be91f95903ad66d775c397302e7dd9228; Huntress also identified 2.24.131[.]246 as a live command-and-control address. The RAT is capable of stealing browser credentials, cookies, autofill and payment data, Chromium keys, FTP credentials, Discord and messaging data, files, and passwords, and the infrastructure was linked to earlier malicious activity dating to May 2025, including domains associated with campaigns tied to StealC infrastructure seized during Operation Endgame.
Cisco Talos reported that the Chaos ransomware group is using a new Rust-based remote access trojan, msaRAT, to conceal command-and-control traffic inside legitimate browser activity. Instead of making direct outbound connections, the malware launches a headless Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge instance with the Chrome DevTools Protocol enabled, injects JavaScript, and uses the browser to establish a WebRTC DataChannel for encrypted communications. Talos said the malware combines WebRTC DTLS with its own ChaCha-Poly1305 encryption using an ECDH-derived shared key, giving operators covert tunneling, browser-assisted remote code execution, and asynchronous multi-threaded control. The reported intrusion chain begins with email or voice phishing, followed by the use of remote management software for persistence and delivery of an MSI installer disguised as a Windows update. That installer, identified as update_ms.msi, is downloaded over plain HTTP on port 443, extracts lib.dll, and loads it directly into memory before starting the browser in remote debugging mode. For signaling, the browser communicates with a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, while Twilio TURN infrastructure relays WebRTC traffic, a design that obscures attacker-controlled systems and makes network-based detection and attribution more difficult.
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