Last seven days
- First activity
- Sep 1, 2026
- Last activity
- Sep 1, 2026
- Feed role
- C2
- Host form
- 0 IP / 2 hostnames
Shai-Hulud is a self-propagating software supply-chain threat cluster centered on malicious npm package compromises that began in September 2025 and later evolved into broader multi-wave and multi-ecosystem activity.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabShai-Hulud
Shai-Hulud is a self-propagating software supply-chain threat cluster centered on malicious npm package compromises that began in September 2025 and later evolved into broader multi-wave and multi-ecosystem activity. It is widely characterized as the first truly self-propagating npm worm. The campaign initially spread by compromising popular JavaScript packages, harvesting secrets from developer and CI/CD environments, and then using stolen publishing credentials and repository access to inject malicious code into additional packages controlled by affected maintainers. More than 500 npm packages were reported compromised in early waves, with later reporting describing recurring variants and related offshoots such as Shai-Hulud 2.0 and Mini Shai-Hulud. Some reporting also places the activity cluster in an evolutionary line leading toward the modular Miasma framework, although separate incidents that merely resemble Shai-Hulud have also been explicitly assessed as unattributed or false-flagged.
Core tradecraft associated with Shai-Hulud includes credential theft, secret reconnaissance, exfiltration, persistence, and automated propagation through trusted developer infrastructure. Documented behavior includes harvesting GitHub personal access tokens, npm tokens, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, and other sensitive material from local environments, repositories, workflow logs, and metadata services. The malware has used tools and logic comparable to TruffleHog-style secret scanning, abuse of GitHub Actions and self-hosted runners, malicious workflow injection, repository modification, and republishing of trojanized packages using compromised maintainer rights or trusted publishing flows. Exfiltration has repeatedly leveraged GitHub itself, including attacker-created repositories, commits, and workflow channels, allowing the actor to blend command-and-control and data theft into legitimate developer traffic.
Later variants expanded the engineering sophistication of the campaign. Reported enhancements across subsequent waves include Bun-based staging and execution, modular dispatch and payload architecture, dead-drop command retrieval through public GitHub artifacts, persistence through developer-environment hooks and operating-system autostart mechanisms, and abuse of trusted automation identities for commit forgery or persona spoofing. Some variants also targeted AI-assisted developer tooling and editor configuration files to gain execution when repositories were opened or developer sessions started. A November 2025 wave reportedly added a destructive fallback that attempted to erase user data when useful credentials could not be found, indicating that some branches of the activity moved beyond pure credential theft into destructive behavior.
Shai-Hulud primarily targets software maintainers, developer workstations, CI/CD runners, and organizations that depend on high-trust open-source packages. Victim environments have included npm package maintainers, GitHub repositories, and cloud-connected build systems. The campaign’s operational objective is best understood as theft of credentials and privileged access that can be reused for further compromise and propagation across software ecosystems. While multiple later incidents have been described as Shai-Hulud-like because they share propagation patterns, GitHub-centric exfiltration, or Bun-based loaders, only directly attributed activity should be considered part of the Shai-Hulud cluster.
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
MITRE ATT&CK
Derp wouldn't exist without the work these projects do for the security community. We rely on their data sources to improve the quality and depth of what we publish. Thank you, we're genuinely grateful.