Clop

GitHub - tjnel/certgraveyard_yara: Automated YARA rule generation from the Cert Central compromised certificate database. · GitHub

A public project called CertGraveyard has expanded efforts to document abused code-signing certificates used to sign malware, building a shared record of certificate abuse and helping defenders trigger revocations with certificate authorities. The project’s creator said the initiative grew out of years of reporting malicious certificates tied to malware such as SolarMarker, and has helped report more than 2,000 certificates, later growing to roughly 2,400 entries in the database. Supporting tooling includes certReport, which automates abuse reports from malware hashes using sources such as VirusTotal and MalwareBazaar, plus an API, downloadable datasets, feeds, hunting queries, and integrations with platforms including MalwareBazaar, UnpacMe, Malcat, MagicSword.io, and WDAC enforcement workflows. The database reflects a broader pattern in which threat actors repeatedly obtain or abuse valid Authenticode certificates to make malware appear trustworthy, reduce Windows warnings, and sustain delivery campaigns. Prior reporting cited SolarMarker cycling through impostor-issued certificates, FakeBat distributing signed MSI and MSIX installers, Netbounce using valid certificates and fake software branding, Dark Caracal signing Bandook variants with legitimate certificates, and Operation Red Signature abusing a stolen vendor certificate in a supply-chain intrusion. CertGraveyard’s operator said certificate authorities often act on external reports within hours, making revocation a practical disruption measure, though the project has also faced operational pressure including a major DDoS attack while handling heavy daily lookup and download volumes from defenders and malware-analysis integrations.

Ransomware Group clop Hits: HONGHE-TECH.COM

The Clop ransomware operation has repeatedly targeted enterprise networks with intrusions that begin with phishing or exploitation of exposed systems, followed by manual lateral movement, credential theft, and domain-wide deployment. Reporting from ANSSI and AhnLab linked earlier campaigns to TA505, describing attacks in which operators used tools such as Cobalt Strike and Mimikatz, encrypted files with .Clop or .CIop extensions, and disrupted business operations at victims including E-Land Group, Software AG, and reportedly Indiabulls Group. Analysts also observed Clop using signed malware components, targeting Active Directory environments, stopping business-critical services before encryption, and in some cases preserving shadow copies depending on the variant. The group increasingly shifted from encryption-only attacks to double extortion and broader data-leak pressure tactics. Clop operators published stolen files on leak sites, demanded multimillion-dollar payments, contacted victims' customers directly to intensify pressure, and were tied to mass data-theft campaigns exploiting managed file transfer flaws such as CVE-2023-0669 in Fortra GoAnywhere MFT, which was linked to theft from about 130 companies. More recent victim listings attributed to Clop include organizations in the U.S., Canada, Peru, China, Taiwan, and Europe across technology, manufacturing, retail, and other sectors, underscoring the group's continued global focus on enterprise-scale ransomware and data-breach operations.

Ransomware Group clop Hits: 9ALTITUDES.COM

Ransomware Group clop Hits: WATERLANDPE.COM

Ransomware Group clop Hits: NETPOWER.COM

Ransomware Group clop Hits: ALDOGROUP.COM (ALDOSHOES.COM)

Ransomware Group clop Hits: IRCO.COM

Ransomware Group clop Hits: LARGAN.COM.TW