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PoshC2

PoshC2 is a Python-based post-exploitation command-and-control framework with multiple agent formats and cross-platform support.

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PoshC2

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PoshC2 is a Python-based post-exploitation command-and-control framework with multiple agent formats and cross-platform support. It is used as an offensive implant and operator framework for maintaining access, executing commands, and extending post-compromise activity on victim systems. It is publicly known as a dual-use framework and has been observed in real intrusions, including activity associated with APT33.

PoshC2 supports command-and-control over HTTP and HTTPS and provides operators with modules for host and domain discovery, credential access, privilege escalation, and persistence. Documented capabilities include keystroke logging; capturing credentials through spoofed Outlook authentication prompts; searching local and remote files for passwords; decrypting credentials stored in RDCMan configuration data; enumerating local and domain user account information; enumerating network adapter information; and executing tasks through WMI. It also includes multiple methods to bypass Windows User Account Control and has GetSystem-style functionality implemented through PowerShell to obtain SYSTEM-level execution.

On Windows, PoshC2 has been documented using PowerShell launchers, registry-based payload storage, Run key persistence, scheduled tasks, and WMI event subscription persistence. It can also load external offensive PowerShell tooling, expanding its credential theft and post-exploitation functionality. Operational reporting has shown PoshC2 delivered through malicious HTA and PowerShell chains, including employment-themed lure activity attributed to APT33, and it has also been deployed as a follow-on payload by other malware such as SystemBC. PoshC2 is most accurately characterized as a post-exploitation framework and backdoor used for interactive intrusion operations rather than a commodity self-propagating malware family.

Capabilities

  • Credential Theft
  • Defense Evasion
  • Keylogging
  • Persistence
  • Post Exploitation
  • Privilege Escalation
  • Reconnaissance

C2 tracking

Seven-day C2 activity

Derp observations, rolling seven-day window

Observed infrastructure

Last seven days

First activity
Aug 18, 2026
Last activity
Aug 23, 2026
Feed role
C2
Host form
2 IP / 0 hostnames

Leading locations

  • US2

Leading providers

  • DigitalOcean, LLC2

Infrastructure traits

  • Hosting 2

Reported operators

Threat actors

1 named in public reporting
APT33

PoshC2 (specifically as used by APT33)

Exploited software

Vulnerabilities linked to PoshC2

3 CVEs

MITRE ATT&CK

PoshC2 in ATT&CK

57 distinct techniques

Techniques

57 techniques
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery T1056.001 Keylogging T1082 System Information Discovery T1071.001 Web Protocols T1083 File and Directory Discovery T1555 Credentials from Password Stores T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1090.004 Domain Fronting T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools T1218.005 Mshta T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service T1053.005 Scheduled Task T1059.001 PowerShell T1218.011 Rundll32 T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution T1620 Reflective Code Loading T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1090 Proxy T1112 Modify Registry T1055 Process Injection T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription T1053 Scheduled Task/Job T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1219 Remote Access Tools T1543.003 Windows Service T1574 Hijack Execution Flow T1071 Application Layer Protocol T1119 Automated Collection T1087.002 Domain Account T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft T1553.002 Code Signing T1021.003 Distributed Component Object Model T1027.002 Software Packing T1497.001 System Checks T1569.002 Service Execution T1036 Masquerading T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material T1547.009 Shortcut Modification T1588.002 Tool T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation T1046 Network Service Discovery T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services T1550.002 Pass the Hash T1560 Archive Collected Data T1110 Brute Force T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1552.004 Private Keys T1003 OS Credential Dumping T1087 Account Discovery T1090.001 Internal Proxy T1007 System Service Discovery T1552.001 Credentials In Files T1204.003 Malicious Image T1040 Network Sniffing

Reporting

Research mentioning PoshC2

Aug 11
Cvefeed High Severity

CVE-2026-62781 - RPC Runtime Library Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Microsoft disclosed CVE-2026-62781, a high-severity remote code execution flaw in the Windows RPC Runtime Library that allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute code over the network. The heap-based buffer overflow, tracked as CWE-122 and scored CVSS 8.1, affects a broad range of Windows client and server platforms, including Windows 10, Windows 11, and Windows Server 2012, 2016, 2019, 2022, and 2025, according to the CVE entry and Microsoft advisory. The exposure is notable because exploitation of remote services has repeatedly enabled rapid lateral movement and internal propagation across Windows environments. MITRE ATT&CK maps this activity to T1210, citing past abuse of SMB, Netlogon, RPC, and Print Spooler flaws by threats such as WannaCry, NotPetya, TrickBot, Conficker, and multiple intrusion groups; Splunk has also tied remote-service exploitation detections to the same technique in prior RCE-related content. Security teams are likely to treat the new RPC flaw as a priority patching issue given its network-reachable nature and the history of Windows remote-service vulnerabilities being used for enterprise-wide spread.

Aug 3
Securelist

Incident response statistics and cases at educational institutions in Brazil | Securelist

Brazilian educational institutions faced a sustained wave of cyber incidents in incident-response cases reviewed from January 2025 through June 2026, with attackers most often gaining access through valid accounts, exploitation of public-facing applications, insider activity, and weak patch management. High-severity cases were dominated by ransomware, particularly DragonForce and LockBit 3, and private institutions were more frequently affected than public ones. Investigators also found that outdated and unpatched systems, including Windows 10 deployments kept past end of support and unpatched Windows Server 2016 hosts, materially increased exposure. Representative intrusions showed attackers relying on common but effective techniques rather than novel tradecraft. One LockBit case involved a custom deployment built from the leaked builder and spread with PsExec, aligning with the well-documented abuse of Windows service execution for lateral movement and payload launch. Another DragonForce intrusion used AnyDesk and log wiping to maintain access and hinder response, while a separate insider case involved a Python keylogger installed on a shared machine to capture credentials. The findings underscore the need for MFA, least privilege, removal of shared accounts, tighter control of remote-access tools, stronger backups, centralized logging, longer EDR retention, and faster patching.

Jul 30
Splunk Research

Detection: Windows Suspicious Child Process of Consent.EXE | Splunk Security Content

Splunk published a Windows endpoint analytic that detects suspicious child processes launched by consent.exe, a behavior strongly associated with User Account Control (UAC) bypass and privilege escalation. Because consent.exe normally displays the UAC elevation prompt rather than spawning executables, the detection treats such process creation as anomalous, excluding WerFault.exe as a known crash-related exception. The analytic maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1548.002, T1068, and T1059, and is designed for telemetry from Sysmon, Windows Security Event ID 4688, and CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 data normalized into Splunk's Endpoint data model. The release aligns with MITRE ATT&CK documentation showing UAC bypass remains a widely used post-compromise technique across ransomware operators, commodity malware, and state-linked intrusion groups. ATT&CK lists methods including COM abuse through CMSTPLUA, scheduled task abuse such as SilentCleanup, registry hijacks involving ms-settings and mscfile, and abuse of trusted Windows binaries including fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, and sdclt.exe. Splunk also published supporting attack simulation data for suspicious child processes of consent.exe, giving defenders a way to test visibility for this privilege-escalation pattern, although the analytic is disabled by default and generates intermediate risk events rather than direct notable alerts.

Jul 22
Splunk Research

Windows Suspicious Child Of Consent.exe | Splunk Security Content

May 19
Trellix Other

Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution

Qakbot operators repeatedly changed their intrusion chains between March and May 2023, using malspam and a rotating set of attachment and container formats including PDF, HTML, ZIP, OneNote, WSF/HTA, and XLL files to deliver the malware. Researchers observed HTML smuggling, obfuscated JavaScript, PowerShell, and DLL-based payload staging in March, followed by ZIP-to-XLL chains that rebuilt payloads from split DAT files and created scheduled tasks for persistence. By April and May, the malware’s operators had shifted from base64-encoded PowerShell toward hex-encoded XMLHTTP requests delivered through WSF files, and used a OneNote-to-MSI lure posing as a Microsoft Azure installer. Later campaigns added stronger defense evasion, including indirect command execution through conhost.exe, DLL side-loading, and curl-based payload retrieval. Researchers also noted that Pikabot samples seen in mid-May shared similar tradecraft, but said the available evidence did not support attributing both malware families to the same actor.

May 14
Splunk Research

Detection: Splunk RCE via External Lookup Copybuckets | Splunk Security Content

Jan 1
Sublime

Detecting QakBot: WSF attachments, OneNote files, and generic attack surface reduction · Blog · Sublime Security

Jan 1
Sophos Threat Research

Qakbot mechanizes distribution of malicious OneNote notebooks | SOPHOS

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