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- Sep 9, 2026
- Last activity
- Sep 14, 2026
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BeaverTail is a Node.js-based first-stage loader and information stealer used in the DPRK-aligned Contagious Interview activity cluster, commonly associated with Lazarus-linked operators including WaterPlum/Famous Chollima.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabBeaverTail
BeaverTail is a Node.js-based first-stage loader and information stealer used in the DPRK-aligned Contagious Interview activity cluster, commonly associated with Lazarus-linked operators including WaterPlum/Famous Chollima. It is delivered through social-engineering campaigns that impersonate recruiters, job candidates, or business contacts and provide trojanized coding challenges, malicious repositories, developer projects, or ClickFix instructions. The activity primarily targets software developers, Web3 and cryptocurrency professionals, and organizations whose endpoints contain source code, cloud credentials, browser sessions, cryptocurrency wallets, and developer secrets.
BeaverTail fingerprints infected systems and steals browser-stored credentials, browser data, session information, and cryptocurrency-wallet extension data. Variants collect sensitive files such as environment files, keys, configuration material, wallet-related data, and developer artifacts, then exfiltrate them to attacker-controlled infrastructure. BeaverTail commonly downloads and launches additional payloads, particularly the Python-based InvisibleFerret backdoor, and some components support remote shell execution, file discovery and transfer, process control, and retrieval of further JavaScript payloads. Campaigns employ obfuscation, staged payload retrieval, execution through development-tool features, and environment-aware delivery controls to reduce static-analysis visibility. BeaverTail has been observed on Windows, macOS, and Linux.
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
Reported operators
Lazarus using LLMs to polymorph BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret for every single target.
They have been using malware called BeaverTail or InvisibleFerret in Contagious Interview campaign since around 2023, they started using new malware since September 2024.
The PolinRider threat group was first detected this year when cybersecurity analysts identified hundreds of GitHub repositories with hidden JavaScript code that downloads an updated version of the BeaverTail malware.
The campaign used the JavaScript infostealer BeaverTail, the cross-platform Python backdoor InvisibleFerret, and most recently OtterCookie, a new backdoor identified in December 2024.
The campaign targeted Web3 and decentralised finance (DeFi) developers globally via AI-generated fake job offers delivered through LinkedIn, using three interoperating malware families BeaverTail, OtterCookie, and InvisibleFerret in a phased infection chain that begins with a malicious coding assessment and culminates in full credential exfiltration and wallet drainage.
The campaign targeted Web3 and decentralised finance (DeFi) developers globally via AI-generated fake job offers delivered through LinkedIn, using three interoperating malware families BeaverTail, OtterCookie, and InvisibleFerret in a phased infection chain that begins with a malicious coding assessment and culminates in full credential exfiltration and wallet drainage.
The code in index.js implements the Node.js fetch API to send an HTTP request to that URL and retrieve BeaverTail malware.
"Tech Note - BeaverTail variant distributed via malicious repositories and ClickFix lure... DPRK’s BeaverTail malware"
MITRE ATT&CK
Reporting
A Sonatype report identified six malicious npm packages that used Ethereum transactions to retrieve and stage malicious payloads, an unusual delivery method that obscures second-stage infrastructure behind blockchain activity. The campaign was linked in public reporting to ContagiousInterview and NullReceiver, indicating continued abuse of the JavaScript and Node.js ecosystem for software supply-chain compromise. The activity aligns with broader attacker tradecraft documented for MITRE ATT&CK T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript), which covers JavaScript and Node.js use for payload delivery, execution, reconnaissance, and command-and-control. Defenders monitoring follow-on behavior should watch for suspicious child-process activity and discovery commands launched from non-shell parent processes, a pattern reflected in Splunk detection guidance for tools such as ipconfig.exe, systeminfo.exe, net.exe, and whoami.exe executed outside normal cmd.exe or PowerShell chains.
Elastic Security Labs reported a Contagious Interview intrusion tied to a DPRK-aligned threat cluster after suspicious activity targeted Elastic’s community Slack workspace. Using a fake recruiter persona named Maxwell, the operator posted a fraudulent job opportunity and coding challenge that directed victims to trojanized Next.js e-commerce repositories. The malicious code hid payload components inside SVG image files using steganography, embedding Base64 fragments in flag images that were reassembled by serverValidation.js and executed with eval() when the local development server started. The campaign matches the broader Contagious Interview tradecraft tracked in MITRE ATT&CK as G1052, which relies on fake hiring outreach, code-repository lures, and social engineering to infect developers across Windows, macOS, and Linux. Elastic said the infection chain deployed a browser credential and crypto-wallet stealer, a file stealer, a persistent Socket.IO RAT, and a clipboard stealer capable of fetching Windows PE payloads, while code similarities to OTTERCOOKIE and infrastructure overlaps previously documented by JFrog reinforced the attribution. MITRE also associates the cluster with malware such as BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret, along with credential theft, financial theft, persistence through platform-specific startup mechanisms, and exfiltration over C2 and cloud or messaging services.
Attackers compromised the Artlist WordPress subdomain new-blog.artlist[.]io and used it to deliver a sophisticated ClickFix malware campaign that presented visitors with a fake CAPTCHA and tricked them into running PowerShell. The injected JavaScript used an EtherHiding technique, querying a Polygon smart contract to dynamically retrieve the next-stage host auth-code-check[.]info, then downloaded a multi-stage infection chain from the attacker-controlled backend. Researchers traced the intrusion to WordPress credentials stolen from an Israeli freelance developer whose machine had been infected by an infostealer after downloading a pirated copy of Adobe Acrobat Pro DC in 2023. The payload chain reportedly used a password-protected archive, a signed StruSoft/FEM-Design updater, and DLL side-loading to decode shellcode and load a final native RAT that supported encrypted and Tor-backed C2, browser credential theft, keylogging, clipboard and screen access, hidden desktop interaction, file transfer, shell and process control, SOCKS proxying, service installation, and in-memory PE delivery.
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