Last seven days
- First activity
- Aug 6, 2026
- Last activity
- Aug 6, 2026
- Feed role
- C2 / Distribution
- Host form
- 1 IP / 0 hostnames
NoEscape is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first observed in May 2023 and assessed in the provided reporting as likely a rebrand or spin-off of Avaddon.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabNoEscape
NoEscape is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first observed in May 2023 and assessed in the provided reporting as likely a rebrand or spin-off of Avaddon. It supports Windows and Linux payloads and conducts double- or multi-extortion, combining file encryption with data theft and publication on a TOR-based leak site; reporting also states the operation offered additional DDoS/spam and call-center extortion options. Multiple sources note an apparent anti-CIS targeting pattern.
Observed intrusion vectors in the provided content include exploitation of public-facing Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), webshell deployment on Exchange, purchase of previously compromised access from initial access brokers, use of valid accounts, RDP for lateral movement, TeamViewer access, and RDP-over-SSH tunneling via Plink. In one case, attackers used the NPPSPY technique by registering a malicious network provider DLL to capture cleartext Exchange authentication credentials, then moved laterally with domain admin privileges. Data exfiltration was observed via MegaSync to Mega cloud storage.
The malware and operator tradecraft described in the content includes anti-debugging checks, language checks to avoid CIS-language systems, mutex creation derived from the machine GUID, host discovery and collection of system metadata, and stealthy command execution through COM and WMI. NoEscape attempts to disable UAC by modifying EnableLUA and ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin, copies itself into APPDATA\\Roaming, and establishes persistence through a scheduled task named SystemUpdate with daily and logon triggers. It uses Restart Manager APIs to identify and terminate processes locking files, stops services and kills processes that may interfere with encryption, deletes shadow copies and backups using vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE, and bcdedit commands, and clears Windows event logs including via wevtutil loops.
The encryption workflow described in the content uses a two-part configuration protected with RC4 keys and Base64 decoding, with configuration elements including public keys, ransom notes, file size limits, wallpaper/note settings, avoided paths/files, locker keys, and file extensions. The malware uses Windows CryptoAPI functions such as CryptAcquireContextW, CryptImportKey, CryptGenKey, CryptExportKey, and CryptEncrypt, and uses an RSA public key from configuration to protect generated encryption keys. Collected host metadata is stored in JSON, encrypted with AES-CBC, and appended to the ransom note. The ransom note is named HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.txt and directs victims to a TOR site using a unique Personal ID.
Victimology in the supplied material indicates NoEscape claimed 123 victims between June and December 2023, with the United States accounting for 26% of affected entities in one cited dataset. Manufacturing, education, and construction were identified as the most affected sectors. Specific incidents referenced include a June 2023 claim against the University of Hawaii, where NoEscape said it stole 65GB of sensitive data, and an October 2023 attack referenced in reporting on the Order of Psychologists of the Lombardy Region. The content also notes that Iranian actors were observed by the FBI partnering with affiliates of NoEscape and other ransomware operations and taking a percentage of ransom payments. One report also states Mikhail Matveev was an affiliate of NoEscape.
Indicators explicitly mentioned in the content include SHA-256 hashes 68ff9855262b7a9c27e349c5e3bf68b2fc9f9ca32a9d2b844f2265dccd2bc0d8 and 8FAF3B4047CD810CA30A6D7174542DC1E1270AD63662AE2F53D222A8A9113AF8, the Plink tunneling endpoint 172.93.181[.]238, and Mega-related IP 66.203.125[.]14.
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
Samples
2e2e035ece4accdee838ecaacdc263fa526939597954d18d1320d73c8bf810c2 2fd3e4fed8a88f9aa00a921cbb6fb564aa64943b20fc512ce3eb134d5ebfd2d3 401b70e0313d7f6dd1fd444a8d61e25ae433a5944a2607405fe5ddbc9b8f7afc 65ba3988d38f83b9ee1f31cafa5bd37dc6b72279f5618aac94d71a904efa0cac b4a3205341b7d6eee7d8a810300a39960ac66c7fb89f585a06c6e1e921a49820 Reported operators
“This post will delve into a recent incident response engagement… involving the Ransomware-as-a-Service known as NoEscape.”
Exploited software
MITRE ATT&CK
Derp wouldn't exist without the work these projects do for the security community. We rely on their data sources to improve the quality and depth of what we publish. Thank you, we're genuinely grateful.