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Mispadu

Mispadu is a Latin American banking trojan focused primarily on Windows systems and historically associated with campaigns targeting Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking users, especially in Mexico and nearby regions.

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Mispadu

Family profile

Mispadu is a Latin American banking trojan focused primarily on Windows systems and historically associated with campaigns targeting Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking users, especially in Mexico and nearby regions. It is part of the broader LATAM banking malware ecosystem that includes families such as Grandoreiro, Guildma, Casbaneiro, Mekotio, and Amavaldo, which share overlapping tradecraft, similar obfuscation approaches, and closely related distribution patterns. Mispadu has been described as one of the more prominent banking malware families active in Mexico and has also been observed targeting financial and cryptocurrency institutions.

Mispadu commonly relies on user execution as part of multistage infection chains. Observed campaigns have used spam with invoice-themed lures to deliver archive files containing Windows Installer packages and heavily obfuscated scripts, which then launch intermediate loaders before injecting or loading the final Delphi payload into memory. Across the LATAM banking trojan ecosystem, MSI-based first stages, ZIP archives, scripting languages such as VBScript, and DLL side-loading are recurring execution patterns, and Mispadu has been linked to these broader operational practices.

Once active, Mispadu performs environmental checks to restrict execution to intended victims and reduce analysis exposure. It checks system language settings and terminates if the host is not configured for Spanish or Portuguese locales. It has also been reported to enumerate installed security products in the victim environment, reflecting both discovery and defense-evasion objectives. Campaign samples have additionally used anti-virtualization checks before continuing execution.

Its core functionality centers on banking fraud and credential theft. Mispadu steals credentials from browsers including Google Chrome, can harvest credentials from mail clients through bundled NirSoft utilities, monitors browser activity related to online banking, and displays fraudulent banking overlays to capture victim-entered data. It also exfiltrates collected financial information to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Beyond banking credential theft, Mispadu includes clipboard hijacking functionality that can capture and replace copied cryptocurrency wallet data, indicating overlap between banking fraud and crypto-theft monetization.

Mispadu communications have been observed using encrypted command-and-control traffic, including use of OpenSSL in some variants. The malware family is part of a cluster of closely cooperating Latin American banking trojan operators that emphasize social engineering, manual fraud workflows, and regional targeting over fully automated post-compromise operations. More recent reporting indicates that infrastructure and delivery tactics previously associated with Mispadu were later reused by the same actor to distribute other payloads, underscoring the adaptability of the operators behind these campaigns.

Capabilities

  • Credential Theft
  • Crypto Theft
  • Defense Evasion
  • Exfiltration
  • Reconnaissance
  • Spoofing

Reported operators

Threat actors

2 named in public reporting
Malteiro

Mispadu checks and will terminate execution if the compromised system’s language ID is not Spanish or Portuguese.

TA2725

TA2725 is a threat actor Proofpoint tracked since March 2022 that is known for using Brazilian banking malware (including Mispadu, Astaroth, and historically Grandoreiro) and credential phishing to target organizations mainly in Brazil, Mexico, and Spain.

MITRE ATT&CK

Mispadu in ATT&CK

58 distinct techniques

Techniques

58 techniques
T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers T1518.001 Security Software Discovery T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.010 AutoHotKey & AutoIT T1497.001 System Checks T1566.002 Spearphishing Link T1055 Process Injection T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1614.001 System Language Discovery T1555 Credentials from Password Stores T1082 System Information Discovery T1204 User Execution T1566 Phishing T1056.003 Web Portal Capture T1056 Input Capture T1219 Remote Access Tools T1113 Screen Capture T1083 File and Directory Discovery T1204.002 Malicious File T1218.011 Rundll32 T1115 Clipboard Data T1071 Application Layer Protocol T1059.001 PowerShell T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application T1056.002 GUI Input Capture T1056.001 Keylogging T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1010 Application Window Discovery T1218.007 Msiexec T1071.001 Web Protocols T1057 Process Discovery T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol T1552.001 Credentials In Files T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.007 JavaScript T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1132.002 Non-Standard Encoding T1571 Non-Standard Port T1547.009 Shortcut Modification T1112 Modify Registry T1573 Encrypted Channel T1555.005 Password Managers T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography T1217 Browser Information Discovery T1036 Masquerading T1176 Software Extensions T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection T1657 Financial Theft T1106 Native API T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File T1176.001 Browser Extensions T1534 Internal Spearphishing T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Reporting

Research mentioning Mispadu

Aug 31
Splunk Research

Detection: MacOS Osascript Displaying Suspicious User Prompt | Splunk Security Content

Splunk Enterprise Security released an anomaly analytic to identify suspicious macOS osascript executions that invoke AppleScript display alert or display dialog commands using credential- or security-themed wording. Such dialogs can impersonate macOS authentication or security notices and trick users into disclosing passwords and other sensitive data, a technique tracked as MITRE ATT&CK T1056.002 (GUI Input Capture). The detection uses osquery process telemetry, maps the execution mechanism to T1059.002 (AppleScript), and generates intermediate risk events rather than notable findings; it is disabled by default. osascript is a legitimate native macOS utility but can also execute AppleScript or JavaScript for Automation to collect clipboard or system data, manipulate applications, and present fake authentication prompts, so alerts require investigation to distinguish malicious activity from legitimate MDM, deployment, support, and automation scripts.

Jul 15
Esentire

DinDoor, DenoRAT, and NightshadeC2: Analyzing TAG-150's Evolving Tradecraft | eSentire

eSentire reported that a June 2026 intrusion against a finance-sector customer began with a ClickFix-style social engineering lure that triggered a malicious command, an MSI installer, and a multi-stage malware chain attributed to TAG-150. The infection sequence used an apparently AI-generated PowerShell script, Griffin20.ps1, to install the Deno runtime and launch the Deno-based loader DinDoor, which then deployed DenoRAT and ultimately NightshadeC2. Investigators said the malware communicated with command-and-control infrastructure including webstizkgao[.]com and used hard-coded JWTs carrying campaign identifiers such as buildId 0def066f14754be9 and buildNote LearnV7msi. The tooling provided broad post-compromise capability, with DenoRAT functioning as a RAT, loader, and stealer that supported command execution, persistence, host fingerprinting, file operations, screenshots, PTY and VNC-style remote control, and theft from browsers and cryptocurrency wallets. eSentire said the malware could also bypass Chromium App-Bound Encryption through DLL injection, a technique widely associated with in-memory execution, evasion, and abuse of legitimate Windows processes in ATT&CK T1055.001. The final NightshadeC2 payload was delivered through a PowerShell-driven Python in-memory loader, decrypted from an encrypted container using AES-256-CBC with a key derived from MoscauHighSmoke, and reflectively mapped into a Python process before the affected host was isolated and remediated.

Apr 19
Loobins

osascript - LOOBins

Mar 1
Elastic Security Labs

Detect Credential Access with Elastic Security | Elastic Security Labs

Elastic Endpoint Security added kernel-driver-derived file and registry telemetry to detect access to sensitive credential stores, including browser data, Windows SAM and LSA secrets, cached domain credentials, credential files, and Windows Credential Manager. Its behavior protections can block high-confidence credential-theft activity associated with tools and malware such as Mimikatz, LaZagne, AgentTesla, FormBook, and Poulight Stealer; KQL and EQL hunting can also identify processes opening multiple sensitive stores or SMB access following a network logon. Attackers commonly extract saved browser usernames, passwords, cookies, and session tokens from stores such as Chrome’s Login Data and Firefox’s key3.db, key4.db, and logins.json. They also dump Windows LSA secrets and cached domain credentials using utilities including Mimikatz, reg save, Impacket secretsdump.py, CrackMapExec, and gsecdump. Cached Windows credentials are generally stored as DCC2/MS-Cache v2 hashes and require offline cracking rather than pass-the-hash, while Linux Active Directory integrations may retain cached credentials in SSSD or Quest database files.

Aug 19
Handlers Diary Full

Brazil malspam pushes Astaroth (Guildma) malware - SANS ISC

Researchers reported that the Guildma banking trojan, also tracked as Astaroth, continued targeting users in Brazil through large phishing campaigns delivering ZIP archives with malicious .LNK files disguised as invoices, payment proofs, tax notices, and COVID-19-themed messages. The malware focused heavily on stealing banking credentials—particularly from Brazilian institutions such as Banco do Brasil—while also harvesting browser, email, e-commerce, and streaming credentials, capturing screenshots and keystrokes, and enabling remote-control functions. Telemetry cited one major wave reaching up to 50,000 first-stage samples per day, underscoring the scale of the operation in Latin America. Analysis showed a fast-evolving, multi-stage infection chain built for stealth and resilience. Guildma/Astaroth abused multiple Windows LOLBins including bitsadmin.exe, regsvr32, wmic, rundll32, certutil, explorer.exe, and Internet Explorer's ExtExport.exe, while newer variants also used the legacy finger.exe client over TCP/79 to fetch commands and a signed Microsoft Silverlight binary, coregen.exe, for Signed Binary Proxy Execution. The malware employed anti-debugging, anti-VM, and locale checks to restrict execution largely to Portuguese-language and Brazil-based systems, stored or loaded modules through obfuscated JScript and alternate data streams, and retrieved encrypted command-and-control infrastructure from YouTube channel descriptions with fallback servers to maintain access if primary infrastructure was disrupted.

Jun 1
Handlers Diary Full

Guildma is now using Finger and Signed Binary Proxy Execution to evade defenses

May 11
Talosintelligence Other

Threat Spotlight: Astaroth - Maze of obfuscation and evasion reveals dark stealer

Mar 28
Mitre Attack Website

Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript, Sub-technique T1059.002 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

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