Last seven days
- First activity
- Sep 17, 2026
- Last activity
- Sep 20, 2026
- Feed role
- C2
- Host form
- 0 IP / 5 hostnames
Latrodectus, also known as IceNova and BlackWidow, is a Windows malware loader with backdoor functionality first identified in late 2023.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabLatrodectus
Latrodectus, also known as IceNova and BlackWidow, is a Windows malware loader with backdoor functionality first identified in late 2023. It is used in financially motivated intrusion chains to profile compromised hosts, receive attacker commands, establish scheduled-task persistence, and download and execute follow-on payloads. Observed payload delivery includes PE files, DLLs launched through Rundll32, in-memory shellcode, IcedID components, information stealers, Brute Ratel C4, and VNC-style remote-access modules. Latrodectus performs detailed host, domain, process, network, file, and security-software reconnaissance and transmits collected host and campaign data to its command-and-control infrastructure. It incorporates anti-analysis and defense-evasion measures including debugger, sandbox, process-count, operating-system, network-adapter, and virtualization-related checks; runtime API resolution; string encryption; packing; masquerading; and self-deletion through NTFS alternate data streams. It has been observed using encrypted web-based command-and-control and can update or terminate itself. Delivery commonly occurs through phishing and spam campaigns using malicious attachments, links, JavaScript, and MSI-based execution chains; it has also been delivered through malicious advertising, compromised-site watering holes, and fake verification lures that induce user execution. TA577 and TA578 have distributed Latrodectus. Multiple security vendors assess it to have a development or operational relationship with the IcedID ecosystem, though the precise relationship is not conclusively established.
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
Samples
Reported operators
TA578 is a threat actor that has used contact forms and email to initiate communications with victims and to distribute malware including Latrodectus, IcedID, and Bumblebee.
Latrodectus is a downloader first discovered by Walmart back in October of 2023... During the Threat Labs hunting activities we discovered a new version of the Latrodectus payload, version 1.4.
Latrodectus is a loader primarily used for initial access and payload delivery. It features dynamic command-and-control (C2) configurations, anti-analysis features such as minimum process count and network adapter check, C2 check-in behavior that splits POST data between the Cookie header and POST data.
2024-03-07 (THURSDAY): LATRODECTUS INFECTION LEADS TO LUMMA STEALER
On 20 September 2024, Proofpoint researchers identified a campaign delivering Brute Ratel C4 and Latrodectus.
Latrodectus, also known as IceNova Backdoor ... is a family of malware that has been observed lately in campaigns linked to groups such as Trickbot ( WIZARD SPIDER ) and Conti (and potentially, in Ransomware deliveries), in addition to being attributed to developers from IcedID . Therefore, Latrodectus has been highlighted as a potential threat and is used as a Loader for other malware.
Latrodectus, also known as IceNova Backdoor ... is a family of malware that has been observed lately in campaigns linked to groups such as Trickbot ( WIZARD SPIDER ) and Conti (and potentially, in Ransomware deliveries), in addition to being attributed to developers from IcedID . Therefore, Latrodectus has been highlighted as a potential threat and is used as a Loader for other malware.
Latrodectus, also known as IceNova Backdoor ... is a family of malware that has been observed lately in campaigns linked to groups such as Trickbot ( WIZARD SPIDER ) and Conti (and potentially, in Ransomware deliveries), in addition to being attributed to developers from IcedID . Therefore, Latrodectus has been highlighted as a potential threat and is used as a Loader for other malware.
LUNAR SPIDER’s recent campaign used Latrodectus, a heavily obfuscated JavaScript loader, to deliver Brute Ratel C4 payloads targeting the financial sector.
Bumblebee and Latrodectus, which are both malware loaders, are designed to steal personal data, along with downloading and executing additional payloads onto compromised hosts.
In addition to OysterLoader, Expel discovered the Rhysida threat actors were also using Latrodectus malware in its campaign...
Exploited software
MITRE ATT&CK
Reporting
A Sonatype report identified six malicious npm packages that used Ethereum transactions to retrieve and stage malicious payloads, an unusual delivery method that obscures second-stage infrastructure behind blockchain activity. The campaign was linked in public reporting to ContagiousInterview and NullReceiver, indicating continued abuse of the JavaScript and Node.js ecosystem for software supply-chain compromise. The activity aligns with broader attacker tradecraft documented for MITRE ATT&CK T1059.007 (Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript), which covers JavaScript and Node.js use for payload delivery, execution, reconnaissance, and command-and-control. Defenders monitoring follow-on behavior should watch for suspicious child-process activity and discovery commands launched from non-shell parent processes, a pattern reflected in Splunk detection guidance for tools such as ipconfig.exe, systeminfo.exe, net.exe, and whoami.exe executed outside normal cmd.exe or PowerShell chains.
Microsoft reported that social-engineering lures are increasingly being used to trick users into launching malware themselves, with the ClickFix technique emerging as a major delivery method across phishing, malvertising, and compromised websites. In ClickFix attacks, victims are shown fake CAPTCHA, verification, or repair prompts that copy malicious commands to the clipboard and persuade them to run them, often leading to fileless execution through LOLBins, obfuscated PowerShell, and follow-on payloads such as Lumma Stealer, DarkGate, Latrodectus, ScreenConnect, and AMOS. Microsoft said the technique has hit thousands of enterprise and consumer devices daily and is now supported by a growing underground market of ClickFix builder kits sold on criminal forums. Fresh activity shows the tactic continuing to evolve. A SmartApeSG campaign observed on compromised web traffic redirected victims to a fake human-verification flow that fetched an HTA downloader from deltaode[.]com, retrieved a ZIP archive, and abused DLL side-loading to launch an unidentified RAT that later communicated with 89.124.79[.]98 over TCP 443. Separately, Microsoft linked the CaptiveCrunch campaign to Storm-2945, a sub-cluster of Russia-linked Midnight Blizzard, which has manipulated DNS and HTTP traffic on hospitality and other captive-portal networks to redirect travelers to phishing pages and fake browser or OS updates delivering CornFlake and ChocoShell for credential theft and espionage, including theft of browser credentials, Microsoft 365 tokens, and Wi-Fi credentials.
Microsoft reported a rise in ACR Stealer intrusions across customer environments, tracing two prominent infection chains that relied on ClickFix social engineering to trick users into launching malicious commands. In one chain, attackers delivered DLLs over WebDAV, then used obfuscated PowerShell, Python-based loaders, and scheduled tasks for persistence; some infections also resolved command-and-control infrastructure through blockchain-based dead-drop techniques such as EtherHiding. A second chain used mshta.exe, VBScript, and obfuscated PowerShell before retrieving payloads hidden inside a hosted JPEG and executing them filelessly in memory. The campaigns were designed to steal browser credentials, cookies, authentication tokens, and sensitive enterprise documents, including PDFs and Microsoft 365-related files. Microsoft said the malware abuses DPAPI to decrypt browser data and stages the collected information for exfiltration. The company published indicators of compromise, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, hunting queries, and mitigation guidance focused on detecting ClickFix lures, suspicious WebDAV or MSHTA activity, obfuscated PowerShell, persistence mechanisms, and browser credential theft.
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