Last seven days
- First activity
- Aug 1, 2026
- Last activity
- Aug 8, 2026
- Feed role
- C2 / Distribution
- Host form
- 0 IP / 64 hostnames
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
Reported operators
What I discovered was that this was a fairly new PhaaS kit known as Kali365. Similar to our reporting on EvilTokens earlier this year, this phishing kit uses the device authentication code flow to trick users into letting them into environments, and keeping access even if MFA is used and passwords are changed post-compromise.
MITRE ATT&CK
Reporting
Active phishing campaigns are using the Jalisco and OmegaLord kits to compromise Microsoft 365 accounts with techniques designed to bypass or weaken multi-factor authentication. According to ReliaQuest, Jalisco abuses the OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow by generating fresh Microsoft device codes in real time and tricking victims into authorizing attacker-controlled devices, allowing attackers to obtain OAuth tokens without directly stealing passwords. OmegaLord uses a fake PDF reader login page to harvest credentials and victims’ phone numbers, which may help attackers intercept or manipulate MFA challenges. After gaining access, attackers have been observed moving quickly through SharePoint and other SaaS platforms to locate and exfiltrate sensitive data, sometimes within minutes, and may follow with extortion threats. ReliaQuest also reported that threat actors register multiple devices to compromised Microsoft Entra ID accounts to preserve access and refresh tokens even after password resets, reflecting a broader surge in phishing-as-a-service activity tied to platforms including EvilTokens, Kali365, Tycoon2FA, Venom, and Darcula. Defenders are being urged to reduce Entra ID device-registration limits, disable or restrict device code authentication through Conditional Access or Okta where not needed, and audit unnecessary app registrations.
Attackers ran a procurement-themed adversary-in-the-middle phishing campaign against universities, enterprises, multinational institutions, and organizations linked to the European Union and United Nations, using compromised Outlook accounts to resend lures from trusted internal or partner addresses. Victims were directed to fake document download portals with CAPTCHA stages and cloned Microsoft 365 login pages impersonating brands including Microsoft, OpenGov, ConstructConnect, and the European Investment Bank, enabling the theft of credentials, session cookies, and MFA-authenticated tokens in real time. Researchers said the operation relied on reverse-proxy phishing kits including EvilProxy, FlowerStorm/Storm-1167, and Kali365 to bypass MFA and gain access to Outlook, SharePoint, and other Microsoft 365 resources. The infrastructure favored aged or compromised domains, RDGA-style phishing domains, phishing subdomain conventions, and injected PHP content on dormant websites, indicating an effort to evade detection by avoiding newly registered infrastructure; defenders were urged to use DNS and passive DNS visibility, Microsoft 365 sign-in monitoring, and conditional access controls because MFA alone does not stop session hijacking.
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