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- Aug 22, 2026
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Mirai is a self-propagating Linux-based IoT botnet malware created by Paras Jha, Josiah White, and Dalton Norman.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabMirai
Mirai is a self-propagating Linux-based IoT botnet malware created by Paras Jha, Josiah White, and Dalton Norman. It compromises internet-exposed embedded devices, principally IP cameras, DVRs, routers, and other network-connected systems, then enrolls them into a centrally controlled botnet for distributed denial-of-service operations. Mirai originally propagated by scanning for Telnet services and attempting a hard-coded set of factory-default or commonly used credentials. Successful logins were reported to loader infrastructure, which selected and executed an architecture-appropriate payload. Later variants and Mirai-derived families have also adopted exploitation of vulnerabilities affecting routers, IoT products, and internet-facing application servers, including Log4Shell and Spring4Shell. Mirai uses process-name randomization, removal of its on-disk binary, and termination of competing processes to reduce detection and maintain control of infected devices. Infections are generally non-persistent and can commonly be removed by rebooting the affected device unless a descendant adds persistence. The botnet became prominent in 2016 through exceptionally large DDoS attacks against gaming services, OVH, KrebsOnSecurity, and Dyn; the Dyn attack disrupted DNS resolution for major online services. Its source code was subsequently released publicly, enabling extensive reuse and the development of numerous variants and descendants. The original operators were identified, arrested, and sentenced in the United States.
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
Samples
51a1dfb301d5f2bde8a824ab3852677fdba245c43aa20b82ff71ac19c71fe2cb 566b58f7c0f09c19269ba8f8d6808f53453a7cd1c4bedb4ff17812a9d4228d8c 8d12b77632fc6cb9ab4545d195797fe66234aa72838474b5d2841a26adc4c995 9613957243feee5856b463939fab394765d6c9d8231c6c96a8f81ff1fb8925e5 b00b22ed236165bdf694d181db72adae003fbd559ec90fd68a2c458932b3ebc8 b7621888cfd420fc73dd74b339ba25c8d826c059b221780407899e66339327f7 c8f06ed0b730462686b73168741912ecb7e9abad92d801e078441605fdfc0b14 f4bc745f5f11a1183d932eea98e8d5601a69c0f7294cbf5327ea41d085d0454b 2d906364a04607ff90a84bbda506f0bbb9c657d3b91a749e31b3b8cd7d8a5470 39939eac4508c4a5bb29de62795fe61d409f9d2e6dd8c4552b4c2159fe7b0432 Reported operators
Observed commodity malware: Agent Tesla and Mirai bot.
All the samples are classified as Gafgyt or Mirai by most detection engines.
Satori, also known as “Masuta,” is a variant of the Mirai botnet, a powerful IoT malware strain that first came online in July 2016.
The publication of proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code in a public vulnerabilities database has lead to increased activity from Mirai-based IoT botnets... Attackers are using the above PoC to break into exposed devices and infect them with Mirai.
The publication of proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code in a public vulnerabilities database has lead to increased activity from Mirai-based IoT botnets... Attackers are using the above PoC to break into exposed devices and infect them with Mirai.
Even Killnet relies on volunteer cyber partisans, but its structure also includes dedicated sub-groups leveraging IoT botnet infrastructures such as Mirai.
FBI Director Chris Wray last Wednesday disclosed an operation to disrupt a Mirai-variant botnet that has exploited more than 260,000 IoT devices globally.
The operator -- a Chinese-speaking actor using the handle angelalk21 (QQ: 597118859, Telegram: @Kuru_x86) -- runs a Mirai-fork botnet with a novel DNS byte-swap anti-analysis technique that causes passive DNS researchers to track decoy IPs in Japan and the US while the real C2 sits in Germany.
...ultimately deploying the Mirai botnet malware and other DDoS-related programs on compromised devices and servers.
Hackers are exploiting vulnerabilities in end-of-life GeoVision IoT devices and Samsung’s MagicINFO server to expand the Mirai botnet... Akamai observed attacks in April targeting GeoVision devices... to download and run an ARM variant of Mirai dubbed LZRD.
All of these files belong to the infamous IoT malware named Mirai.
They have employed botnets such as those based on DieNet or Mirai variants for DDoS attacks...
Exploited software
MITRE ATT&CK
Reporting
The Dysphoria botnet has compromised about 296,000 internet-connected devices, largely routers, cameras, gateways, and other embedded Linux or IoT systems, and is being used to launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks while also relaying attacker traffic through infected hosts. Reporting citing Shadowserver says the botnet has expanded beyond disruption to include residential proxy functionality, allowing malicious traffic and command-and-control relay activity to appear as if it originates from ordinary home or small-business internet connections. The exposed population reflects devices that are already compromised, rather than victims of a single confirmed exploit chain, and prior reporting linked Dysphoria infections to Telnet and SSH password attacks alongside exploitation of known vulnerabilities. Defenders are being urged to investigate exposed management services, update firmware, replace weak or reused credentials, disable unnecessary remote administration, segment IoT devices from critical networks, and retire unsupported hardware that can no longer be secured.
FortiGuard Labs disclosed a previously undocumented Linux botnet, Evooo1Bot, a Mirai-derived malware family that has been actively targeting Internet-facing devices since at least July 2026. The botnet exploits known vulnerabilities in routers, firewalls, IP cameras, and other edge hardware from vendors including Alcatel, D-Link, Mitsubishi Electric, Netgear, Tenda, and Telesquare, then deploys architecture-specific binaries from a shared loader at 91.92.40[.]118. Researchers said the malware clears bash history after infection, performs anti-analysis and anti-sandbox checks, and communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure over encrypted channels on port 443. Evooo1Bot expands on typical Mirai behavior with SSH brute-force scanning, credential sniffing for default or exposed access credentials, persistence mechanisms, and an integrated exploit module for multiple known flaws. Researchers highlighted its reverse SOCKS proxy capability as the most consequential feature because compromised edge devices can be repurposed as long-lived relay nodes to conceal attacker origin, support lateral movement, and enable follow-on intrusions into internal networks. Reported activity has been concentrated across North America, South America, Europe, India, China, and Japan, underscoring broad exposure for organizations running unpatched perimeter devices.
A critical pre-authentication remote code execution flaw, tracked as CVE-2025-55182 and dubbed React2Shell, was disclosed in React Server Components and related React Flight server-side deserialization logic used by React.js, Next.js, and similar frameworks. The vulnerability affects React Server Components versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, and 19.2.0 in the packages react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack, where unsafe deserialization of HTTP request payloads sent to Server Function endpoints can lead to arbitrary code execution in Node.js before authentication. Public reporting said the flaw was fixed in the React repository through pull request #35277, and vendor advisories and CISA tracking indicate the issue drew urgent attention. Security researchers later reported active in-the-wild exploitation beginning almost immediately after disclosure, with mass scanning followed by deployment of Cobalt Strike, Sliver, cryptominers, reverse proxies, a Go backdoor, botnet activity, and a Node.js Secret-Hunter payload aimed at stealing credentials and secrets. Observed campaigns targeted both Linux and Windows systems, and analysis tied the root cause to improper property ownership checks in React's reviveModel function that allowed attacker-controlled serialized payloads to traverse prototype properties. The official patch replaced unsafe ownership checks with Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(...), added explicit handling for __proto__, and prompted guidance to upgrade affected React and Next.js deployments and monitor exposed Server Function endpoints for exploitation attempts.
TeamTNT continued to evolve from a Linux-focused cryptojacking group into a broad cloud threat actor targeting exposed Redis, Docker, Kubernetes, Jupyter, Hadoop, PostgreSQL, Tomcat, Nginx, SSH, and other internet-facing services. Researchers tied the group to worm-like campaigns that rapidly scanned for vulnerable hosts, deployed XMRig miners, dropped Tsunami-based IRC bots including DDoS-capable variants, and used malicious container images on Docker Hub to spread payloads at scale. One TeamTNT-linked Docker Hub account reportedly served images pulled more than 150,000 times, while later campaigns showed the group abusing public registries, compromised accounts, and cloud-native tooling to infect newly exposed systems and report them back to command-and-control infrastructure. Across these operations, TeamTNT consistently paired monetization with aggressive credential theft and stealth. Investigations found the group harvesting AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, Git, NPM, Grafana, database, and storage secrets; stealing SSH keys and host data; and using tools such as Weave Scope, Peirates, BotB, MimiPenguin, Mimipy, tmate, and Gsocket to expand access and persistence. Analysts also documented detection evasion through log wiping, process hiding, LD_PRELOAD userland rootkits, the Diamorphine kernel rootkit, privileged containers with restart policies, and even disabling runc to lock out rival attackers, underscoring TeamTNT’s shift from opportunistic mining to sustained compromise of cloud and container environments.
Researchers analyzed NULLZEREPTOOL, a Python-based attack framework exposed in Pastebin posts, and found a Telegram-controlled platform focused primarily on distributed denial-of-service operations. The tool links two source-code variants through shared credentials and core logic: an earlier build centered on DDoS and proxy management, and a later version that retained the same attack engine while expanding into additional modules. Analysis showed support for 20 DDoS methods, Telegram-based command and control, proxy harvesting and validation, a Flask API, key management, and logging tied to payment-card data, with evidence that the framework was tested against several websites. The newer code also introduced wireless attack functions, credential-related features, and a hierarchical botnet tasking model, but researchers said many of those additions appear incomplete or unproven. Flare found that the DDoS engine, Telegram C2, and proxy pipeline were implemented in source, while the WiFi, Bluetooth, credential-theft, and broader botnet capabilities appeared to depend on missing client artifacts or external tooling. The assessment concludes that NULLZEREPTOOL is best understood as a low-tier, Telegram-managed DDoS panel showing signs of malware-as-a-service feature expansion rather than a confirmed advanced botnet or wireless exploitation platform.
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