Last seven days
- First activity
- Aug 26, 2026
- Last activity
- Sep 1, 2026
- Feed role
- C2
- Host form
- 2 IP / 11 hostnames
LokiBot is a Windows information stealer with credential-theft and keylogging functionality.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabLokibot
LokiBot is a Windows information stealer with credential-theft and keylogging functionality. It can collect credentials from multiple applications and from Safari, Chromium-based, and Mozilla Firefox-based browsers, capture keystrokes, identify the infected host's username and domain name, and transmit stolen data to command-and-control infrastructure. LokiBot has been delivered through malicious email attachments that prompt recipients to enable Office macro content; it can use VBA/XLS macros and VBScript for execution. Observed variants use PowerShell embedded in batch scripts, abuse Windows Installer through msiexec, and employ process hollowing or shellcode execution using dynamically resolved Windows APIs. LokiBot has also modified the Windows Registry and used UAC-bypass techniques, created or used scheduled-task mechanisms, repeatedly decoded or decrypted payload stages, and deleted dropped files following UAC bypass to reduce forensic evidence.
C2 tracking
Derp observations, rolling seven-day window
Samples
668b4176657d8ff0f4d9c2559d5fc8c93b91c72fbeed238b5983f94b9055ae3a 1b92d7190164658d01f5d9fa78525171ad8b4d07bf61507f83c36de906eeb0d5 22b0ae86d45409b06bf93337b9067632f40838b773cbcc505cf711ffb24114c0 67565eb07244fe18c35037c524c5bf6558a9405559f4bb564b114e20986e6b3c 89f6c08fa045d14eb73a0992145a724bc34d531d7af3dcc4901a1b7c7833aede 059c32936c557da9d73c10957a92251af1d8294f30b295fae39b2711a3b2aff9 4e5cc8cb98584335400d00f0a0803c3e0202761f3fbe50bcab3858a80df255e1 4e5cebe1908e12e8a4ed1198fb01fb87871dbe54847855b11b3540dbc47bbe88 54942b5bcfc9add448903934fc61f4e02bf2dc6378a65f0aa4af346e858fe9d3 738eacc140159cd81dff41dd16c806eb7c0c8391c256f1738d75d0321f77ba2e Reported operators
An email campaign attempting to distribute the Lokibot password-stealing malware used a message attempting to spoof company emails on COVID-19 response policy as a lure.
[👽TA] TA558 (🏴): Steganography using other malwares (AgentTesla, FormBook, Remcos, LokiBot, GuLoader or XWorm)
The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).
The group relied exclusively on a variety of publicly available spyware and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), including AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, Pony, and NetWire.
Exploited software
MITRE ATT&CK
Reporting
Splunk published a Windows endpoint analytic that detects suspicious child processes launched by consent.exe, a behavior strongly associated with User Account Control (UAC) bypass and privilege escalation. Because consent.exe normally displays the UAC elevation prompt rather than spawning executables, the detection treats such process creation as anomalous, excluding WerFault.exe as a known crash-related exception. The analytic maps to MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1548.002, T1068, and T1059, and is designed for telemetry from Sysmon, Windows Security Event ID 4688, and CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 data normalized into Splunk's Endpoint data model. The release aligns with MITRE ATT&CK documentation showing UAC bypass remains a widely used post-compromise technique across ransomware operators, commodity malware, and state-linked intrusion groups. ATT&CK lists methods including COM abuse through CMSTPLUA, scheduled task abuse such as SilentCleanup, registry hijacks involving ms-settings and mscfile, and abuse of trusted Windows binaries including fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, and sdclt.exe. Splunk also published supporting attack simulation data for suspicious child processes of consent.exe, giving defenders a way to test visibility for this privilege-escalation pattern, although the analytic is disabled by default and generates intermediate risk events rather than direct notable alerts.
Elastic added behavioral Windows keylogger detection to Elastic Defend 8.12, using Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) to observe API activity associated with keystroke collection through polling, keyboard hooks, Raw Input, and DirectInput. Prebuilt endpoint rules identify suspicious use of APIs including GetAsyncKeyState, SetWindowsHookEx, and RegisterRawInputDevices. In testing on Windows 10, Elastic Defend detected a proof-of-concept Raw Input keylogger soon after it executed, flagging an untrusted process that registered for keyboard input. The telemetry captures API arguments, call-stack context, process-signature status, and related process metadata, enabling defenders to investigate credential- and information-theft activity while reducing false positives from legitimate accessibility and input software.
Security firms reported multiple spearphishing campaigns that used LinkedIn job applications, fake job offers, and poisoned resumes to deliver the More_eggs malware to recruiters, hiring managers, and other business professionals. In observed intrusions, victims were directed through legitimate-looking resume workflows that ended with a malicious archive or shortcut file, often disguised as a document, which launched obfuscated activity and installed the JavaScript-based backdoor. The campaigns were seen across sectors including industrial services, aerospace and defense, legal, accounting, staffing, and healthcare technology, showing a sustained focus on personnel involved in recruiting and hiring. The malware and delivery chain were linked to Golden Chickens (also known as Venom Spider) and associated tooling such as VenomLNK, TerraLoader, and TerraPreter, though the specific operators behind individual incidents were not always confirmed. The attacks abused signed Windows binaries including regsvr32, wmic, msxsl.exe, ie4uinit.exe, and in earlier cases cmstp to evade detection, establish execution, perform discovery, and communicate with command-and-control infrastructure. Defenders said More_eggs can support credential theft, data exfiltration, lateral movement, remote access, and follow-on ransomware activity, and in at least one case endpoint telemetry caught suspicious XSL script processing and related malicious behavior before the intrusion succeeded.
Researchers reported that LokiLocker is a relatively new ransomware-as-a-service family targeting Microsoft Windows systems through a small, vetted affiliate network, with activity observed across Eastern Europe, Asia, and English-speaking victims. The malware, first seen in the wild in 2021, encrypts files using AES with RSA-protected keys, demands payment by email, and is written in .NET with NETGuard and the KoiVM virtualization plugin to complicate reverse engineering. Early infections were linked in some cases to trojanized brute-checker tools, and no free decryptor was available. BlackBerry researchers said the operation may be using false-flag indicators to obscure attribution, citing Iranian-linked clues such as affiliate usernames, cracking tools associated with the AccountCrack team, and an Iran exclusion list in code, while cautioning that the true origin remains unclear. LokiLocker is also notable for a configurable wiper function that can delete non-system files, overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR), and force a Blue Screen of Death if victims refuse to pay, increasing the risk of destructive impact beyond conventional ransomware encryption.
Elastic Endpoint Security added kernel-driver-derived file and registry telemetry to detect access to sensitive credential stores, including browser data, Windows SAM and LSA secrets, cached domain credentials, credential files, and Windows Credential Manager. Its behavior protections can block high-confidence credential-theft activity associated with tools and malware such as Mimikatz, LaZagne, AgentTesla, FormBook, and Poulight Stealer; KQL and EQL hunting can also identify processes opening multiple sensitive stores or SMB access following a network logon. Attackers commonly extract saved browser usernames, passwords, cookies, and session tokens from stores such as Chrome’s Login Data and Firefox’s key3.db, key4.db, and logins.json. They also dump Windows LSA secrets and cached domain credentials using utilities including Mimikatz, reg save, Impacket secretsdump.py, CrackMapExec, and gsecdump. Cached Windows credentials are generally stored as DCC2/MS-Cache v2 hashes and require offline cracking rather than pass-the-hash, while Linux Active Directory integrations may retain cached credentials in SSSD or Quest database files.
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