We have observed final payloads including Ramnit, Gootkit, DarkVNC, Ursnif, and PsiXBot.
GootKit
Gootkit is a Windows banking trojan and modular malware platform first identified in 2014.
Profile source: Mallory opens in a new tabGootKit
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Gootkit is a Windows banking trojan and modular malware platform first identified in 2014. It began as a banking-focused threat and later expanded into a broader information-stealing and post-compromise framework. The malware is notable for a multi-stage architecture that combines a native loader with a JavaScript-based main body executed through an embedded Node.js runtime, as well as extensive anti-analysis and anti-virtualization logic intended to frustrate sandboxing and reverse engineering.
Gootkit has historically been used to steal browser data and authentication material, collect cookies, capture keystrokes, take screenshots, and perform form grabbing and web-injection activity associated with man-in-the-browser operations. It has also been observed modifying browser traffic and patching certificate-validation logic inside targeted browser processes to facilitate interception and manipulation of encrypted sessions. Reported browser targets include major Chromium-based browsers, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, and Safari on Windows. The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure using custom packet formats and supports exfiltration of credentials, logs, screenshots, active-window data, and other victim information.
The loader component uses staged decryption and in-memory execution, including shellcode-based unpacking and browser-focused code injection. It employs anti-debugging and anti-VM checks and may stall indefinitely when it detects analysis environments. Persistence has been achieved through Windows service creation and abuse of policy-related mechanisms. Gootkit has also been associated with browser-process injection and broader defense-evasion tradecraft.
Distribution has evolved over time. Early campaigns used spam and exploit kits, while later activity relied heavily on compromised websites, fake forum pages, and SEO poisoning to lure victims into downloading JavaScript-based loaders. GootLoader has been widely described as the initial-access framework used to deliver Gootkit and other follow-on payloads, making Gootkit part of a broader criminal delivery ecosystem. Campaigns linked to GootLoader and related infrastructure have targeted business users and sectors including legal, government, finance, healthcare, automotive, pharmaceutical, energy, and other enterprises, with significant victimization reported in Europe and North America.
Gootkit has also appeared in multi-malware operations and has been delivered by or alongside other criminal services and malware families. It has been referenced as a downstream payload in campaigns involving loaders and botnets such as Emotet, and it has been associated with financially motivated cybercrime activity targeting banking customers and enterprise environments. Its long-running use, modular design, and integration with web-injection and credential-theft workflows make it a significant banking-trojan family in the Windows threat landscape.
Capabilities
- Credential Theft
- Defense Evasion
- Exfiltration
- Keylogging
- Persistence
- Process Injection
Reported operators
Threat actors
3 named in public reportingDelivered malware included ZLoader (a.k.a. Terdot), Gootkit, Ursnif, Corebot, Panda Banker, Atmos, Mazar Bot, and Red Alert Android malware.
Storm-0324 has distributed a range of first-stage payloads since at least 2016, including: ... Gootkit, a banking trojan
MITRE ATT&CK
GootKit in ATT&CK
59 distinct techniquesTechniques
59 techniquesReporting
Research mentioning GootKit
Gootkit Banking Trojan | Part 2: Persistence & Other Capabilities - SentinelLabs
Researchers detailed how the Gootkit banking trojan’s first-stage loader establishes persistence, evades analysis, and prepares browser-focused theft operations. The malware, a long-running Node.js-based threat associated with banking fraud, uses self-injection, multithreading, and runtime string decryption, then performs extensive sandbox and virtual-machine checks against filenames, environment variables, CPU identifiers, MAC prefixes, loaded modules, usernames, computer names, and BIOS-related registry values. If it detects an analysis environment, Gootkit may delete itself or sleep indefinitely; otherwise, it continues to persistence and payload retrieval. The loader stores encrypted configuration data, recovers command-and-control settings with a simple XOR routine, and can persist either by creating a randomly named Windows service under %SystemRoot% or by abusing IEAK PendingGPOs so explorer.exe launches it without administrator rights. It also acts as an updater, sending host metadata to C2 servers over HTTP, downloading replacement executables, disabling Internet Explorer Protected Mode, and injecting decrypted x86 and x64 DLLs into browser processes via section mapping APIs. Separate reporting on a misconfigured Gootkit C2 server showed operators targeting mainly German and French bank customers with web injects, stolen-data parsers, and fraud-enabling notifications, while Microsoft published hunting guidance linking likely delivery and C2 activity to alerts involving wscript.exe, ZIP files, and JavaScript execution.
“Gootloader” expands its payload delivery options | SOPHOS
Attackers operating the Gootkit loader compromised legitimate websites and used SEO poisoning to lure users searching for legal document templates into downloading malicious ZIP archives. The archives contained JavaScript that, once executed, launched obfuscated PowerShell and began a multi-stage infection chain designed to avoid writing the final payload to disk. Trend Micro reported that the updated intrusion flow used registry stuffing, scheduled-task persistence, and reflective in-memory loading to reconstruct and run a fileless Cobalt Strike beacon. The campaign differed from earlier Gootkit activity by shifting from freeware-themed lures to legal-document themes and by encrypting registry-stored content with a custom text-replacement algorithm instead of Base64; in the observed case, the beacon communicated with 89.238.185.13 before the attack was interrupted.
Targeted Attack Leverages India-China Border Dispute
Researchers documented targeted intrusion campaigns that used military and geopolitical decoy documents to compromise victims in South Asia and deploy Cobalt Strike. Cisco Talos reported that attackers distributed malicious Microsoft Office files posing as Indian Air Force and other government or military documents, with macros dropping a custom loader called IndigoDrop into the Windows Startup folder for persistence. IndigoDrop performed anti-infection checks, fetched Metasploit shellcode, and ultimately loaded an XOR-encoded Cobalt Strike beacon hidden in trojanized jQuery files, while related Python modules conducted reconnaissance and stole browser and Wi-Fi credentials. A separate campaign analyzed by Zscaler used a Word document themed around the India-China border dispute to trigger a macro-delivered PowerShell chain that staged shellcode behind a fake GIF header and installed a Cobalt Strike beacon over HTTPS. The operators used fileless techniques, spoofed HTTP Host headers such as update.windows.microsoft.com, and in some variants injected an RSA-encrypted payload into notepad.exe; researchers also identified infrastructure including 47.240.73.77, 114.67.110.37, and 360doc.com-based command-and-control domains. Across both campaigns, the attackers relied on topical military lures, multi-stage loaders, and legitimate-looking web traffic to conceal remote access activity against likely government and defense-related targets.